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Social epidemiologist Davey Smith (2011) argues that epidemiologists should accept a 
gloomy prospect: considerable randomness at the individual level means that they 
should keep their focus on modifiable causes of disease at the population level.  The 
difficulty epidemiology has had in moving from significant population-level risk factors to 
improved prediction of cases at an individual level is analogous to the lack of success in 
the search for systematic aspects of the non-shared environmental influences that 
human quantitative genetics claims overshadow common environmental influences 
(e.g., the family’s socioeconomic status which siblings have in common).  This article 
responds to the argument and analogy, aiming to draw three audiences—social 
epidemiologists, human quantitative geneticists, and philosophers of science—into a 
shared discussion that centers not on randomness, but on heterogeneity in various 
forms.  The first half undercuts the analogy, providing a critical account of human 
quantitative genetics that explains why its estimates are unreliable and typical 
interpretations, such as that of non-shared environmental influences, unjustified.  In the 
process, attention is drawn to the possibility of underlying heterogeneity—when similar 
responses of different types in a species or of different groups of people are observed, it 
need not be assumed that similar conjunctions of genetic and environmental factors (or, 
in epidemiology, risk and protective factors) have been involved in producing those 
responses.  The second half introduces several additional forms of heterogeneity and 
captures their potential significance for epidemiology in four conceptual themes.  The 
 2 
themes complicate Davey Smith’s advice for epidemiologists not to seek improved 




In the John Snow Lecture to the World Congress of Epidemiology, George Davey Smith 
(2011) addressed the difficulty epidemiology has had moving from significant 
population-level risk factors to improved prediction of cases at an individual level.  The 
gloomy prospect of his account is that epidemiology is concerned with the mean of the 
group and has to discount random variation around that mean.  Epidemiologists should, 
he advises, accept considerable randomness at the individual level and keep their focus 
on modifiable causes of disease at the population level. 
In making his case, Davey Smith draws an analogy from human quantitative 
genetics, a field that revolves around partitioning variation in a trait into a heritability 
fraction and other components.  The field claims that non-shared environmental 
influences overshadow common environmental influences—the former corresponding to 
differences among siblings raised together; the latter to influences such as 
socioeconomic status that the siblings in a family usually have in common.  Davey 
Smith notes that the search for systematic aspects of the non-shared environmental 
influences has been unsuccessful, which he sees in the same terms as the lack of 
success by epidemiologists who seek individual-level risk prediction.   
This article takes the use of this analogy by an epidemiologist as an opportunity 
to address three audiences: social epidemiologists, human quantitative geneticists, and 
philosophers of science—especially those who have examined debates about 
heritability of human traits.  My goal is to draw the different audiences into a shared 
discussion that centers not on randomness, but on heterogeneity in various forms.  The 
first half (sections 2-5) undercuts the analogy by providing a critical account of human 
quantitative genetics that explains why its estimates are unreliable and typical 
interpretations, such as that of non-shared environmental influences, are unjustified.  In 
the process, attention is drawn to the possibility of underlying heterogeneity—when 
similar responses of different types in a species or of different groups of people are 
observed, it need not be assumed that similar conjunctions of genetic and 
environmental factors have been involved in producing those responses.  The second 
half (sections 6-7) extends underlying heterogeneity to include risk and protective 
factors in epidemiology, introduces several additional forms of heterogeneity, and 
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captures their potential significance for epidemiology in four conceptual themes.  The 
themes complicate Davey Smith’s advice for epidemiologists not to seek improved 
prediction of cases at an individual level and his view of the limited prospects for 
personalized medicine. 
 
2. Genetic is not genetic is not genetic 
The first step in developing a critical account of quantitative genetics is to identify three 
conceptually and empirically distinct senses of “genetic,” pertaining to: statistical 
partitioning of variation in measurements on a trait; relatedness in terms of the fraction 
of variable part of genome shared; and the statistical association of a trait with 
measurable genetic factors that underlie the development of that trait.  (There are other 
senses of genetic, such as “runs in the family,” but these will not be the focus here.)  
Before elaborating on the significance of the different senses of genetic, two 
terminological notes are in order: 
1. “Factor” is used throughout the article in a non-technical sense to refer simply 
to something whose presence or absence can be observed or whose level can be 
measured.  Measurable genetic factors include the presence or absence of alleles at a 
specific locus on a chromosome, repeated DNA sequences, reversed sections of 
chromosomes, and so on.  Measurable environmental factors can range widely, say, 
from mean daily intake of calories to degree of maltreatment that a person experienced 
as a child. 
2. An agricultural variety or breed is a group of individuals whose mix of genetic 
factors can be replicated, as in an open pollinated plant variety, or any group of 
individuals whose relatedness by genealogy can be characterized, such as offspring of 
a given pair of parents. A location is the situation or place in which the variety is raised, 
such as a specific experimental research station. 
In regards to statistical partitioning of variation in measurements on a trait, Figure 
1 depicts the ideal case, namely, an agricultural evaluation trial where each of a set of 
varieties is raised in each of set of locations, and there are two or more replicates in 
each variety-location combination.  The means for each variety across all locations and 
replicates can be estimated; the variance of these variety means is the so-called genetic 
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variance of classical quantitative genetics.  The term genetic variance here is a 
contraction of genotypic variance, where genotype is a synonym for an agricultural 
variety and does not refer to pairs of alleles.  Genotypic variance is shorthand, in turn, 
for variance of the genotypic values, i.e., the variety means just described.  The figure 
makes clear that partitioning or analysis of variation for a given trait neither requires nor 
produces knowledge about the genetic or environmental factors that underlie the 
development of that trait in the different variety-location combinations. 
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Figure 1.  Partitioning of variation for a given trait in the ideal agricultural evaluation trial 
where each of a set of varieties is raised in each of set of locations, and there are two or 
more replicates in each variety-location combination.  The bars next to the varieties and 
locations indicate the average value of the trait for, respectively, each variety and 
location. The variation between replicates within variety-location combinations is 
indicated by the size of the curly brackets.  The non-systematic shading of the brackets 
indicates that the variation between replicates is not correlated from one variety-location 
combination to another.  (For graphic clarity, the average values for each variety-
location combination after allowing for the variety and location averages are not shown.)   
 
Broad-sense heritability (hereon: heritability) is by definition is the ratio of the 
variance among variety means (i.e., genotypic values) to the variance of the trait across 
the whole data set.  In the agricultural evaluation trial of Figure 1, this quantity can be 
readily estimated.  Similarly, for estimation of the fraction of variance due to differences 
among location means, otherwise called the environmental variance (where 
environment here is a synonym for location), and for the fraction due to variety-location 
interaction, otherwise called genotype-environment interaction. (This last term, 
confusingly, has no conceptual or empirical relationship to gene-environment 
interaction, a concept introduced in section 6). 
Relatedness in terms of the fraction of variable part of genome shared comes 
into play when the data set is not as complete as in the ideal agricultural trial.  In the 
field of quantitative genetics the estimation of heritability and other fractions of the trait’s 
overall variance typically makes use of the genealogical relatedness of the varieties or 
genotypes.  For example, as is common in studies of humans, the similarity of pairs of 
monozygotic twins, which share all their genes, can be compared with the similarity of 
pairs of dizygotic twins, which share most of their genes, but only around half of the 
genes that vary in the population.  An estimate of heritability can be derived using a 
formula or a Structural Equation Model that takes into account the extent to which the 
mean similarity of monozygotic twins raised in the same family exceeds the mean 
similarity of dizygotic twins raised in the same family (Rijsdijk and Sham 2002) (Figure 
2).  (The estimation of the location or environmental fraction of the variation, its division 
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into shared and non-shared components, and other details are taken up in section 5.)  
 
 
Figure 2. The basis for a comparison of the similarity of monozygotic twins raised 
together in the same locations or families (MZT) with the similarity of dizygotic twin pairs 
(DZT). The variation between twins in a pair is indicated by the size of the curly 
brackets.  In contrast to the agricultural evaluation trial in Figure 1, the replicates of any 
twin pair are raised in only one household per twin pair. 
 
Another terminological note is in order: From hereon, the agricultural terms 
“variety” and “location” are used even when referring to human studies whenever the 
entity or situation can be identified without reference, respectively, to measurable 
genetic and environmental factors.  For humans, a location is typically the family of 
upbringing.  The more common terms for variety and location, genotype and 
environment, invite conflation with genetic and environmental factors and confusion 
about what is and is not entailed (Keller 2010). 
 8 
Classical quantitative genetics, like the statistical partitioning of variation from the 
agricultural trials, makes reference neither to the measurable genetic factors that 
underlie the development of that trait nor to the underlying environmental factors.  
(Models of hypothetical genes are required to generate the traditional formulas of 
quantitative genetics [Falconer and Mackay (1996), Lynch and Walsh (1998)], but this is 
a conceptually distinct matter—one that is taken up in section 5.)   In contrast, the 
statistical association of a trait with measurable genetic factors that underlie the 
development of that trait has received increasing attention in the era of genomics (even 
though detecting such associations has been possible since the rediscovery of 
Mendelian genetics at the turn of the last century).  The implications of such 
associations are discussed in sections 6-7. 
 
3. Underlying heterogeneity 
As described in the previous section, the estimation of heritability is associated with 
analysis of variation in traits, not transmission of heritable factors.  Moreover, the 
analysis of variation for a given trait does not produce knowledge about the genetic or 
environmental factors that that underlie the development of that trait.  This last point is 
widely recognized, yet it is commonplace for researchers and commentators to describe 
estimates of heritability for a trait as the fraction of variation “due to genetic differences” 
or “due to differences in genetic factors” (albeit factors yet to be identified).  By 
implication, the genetic and environmental variances are held to capture the relative 
influence of, respectively, genetic and environmental factors. 
The unwarranted construal of heritability in terms of genetic factors seems to 
have two sources: conflation with the commonplace term heritable as meaning 
transmitted through genes from parent to offspring; and use of the shorthand “genetic 
variance” to refer to the variance among genotypic values or, in the terms of this article, 
variance among variety means.  More recently, the construal of heritability in terms of 
genetic factors has been reinforced by use of the term missing heritability when a 
conceptually distinct quantity—the fraction of variation for a trait associated with 
genomic variants identified in GWA studies—is much lower than the heritability 
estimated by classical quantitative genetics (Manolio et al. 2009).  
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Three observations about the agricultural trial and the quantitative genetics study 
of relatives help counteract the common muddying of the distinction between heritability 
as derived from analysis of variation in traits and the transmission of heritable factors.  
The third observation—about underlying heterogeneity—is the most important for the 
subsequent sections of the article. 
1.  The variety means (or genotypic values) are means over the trait as it has 
developed in a specific range of variety-location (genotype-environment) combinations.  
The variance of those means thus reflects differences in the ways those variety-location 
combinations—and not simply the varieties in themselves—influence the trait 
development.  
2. The partitioning of variation could, in principle, be undertaken even if the trait 
measurements were of varieties from different species, classes, or even kingdoms. This 
thought experiment implies that the variation among the variety means need not 
correspond to some gradient in genetic factors.  Nothing in the method of partitioning 
variation, even within a species, requires that such a gradient exists.  This observation 
also applies to the variation among location means or environmental variance. 
3. Even if the similarity among twins or a set of close relatives is associated with 
similarity of yet-to-be-identified genetic factors, the factors may not be the same from 
one set of relatives to the next, or from one location (environment) to the next.  In other 
words, the underlying factors may be heterogeneous.  It could be that pairs of alleles, 
say, AAbbcbDDee, subject to a sequence of environmental factors, say, FghiJ, are 
associated, all other things being equal, with the same outcome as alleles 
aabbCCDDEE subject to a different sequence of environmental factors FgHiJ (Figure 
3).  
The possibility of heterogeneity of underlying genetic and environmental factors 
has not been widely acknowledged by quantitative geneticists.  Heterogeneity in the 
genetic factors underlying traits might explain the limited success GWA studies have 
had identifying causally relevant genetic variants behind variation in human traits with 
moderate to high heritability values.  The possibility of underlying heterogeneity is 
consistent with, but more nuanced than, the standard view that most medically 




Figure 3.  Factors underlying a trait may be heterogeneous even when monozygotic 
twins raised together (MZT) are more similar than dizygotic twins raised together (DZT).  
The greater similarity is indicated by the smaller size of the curly brackets.  The 
underlying factors for two MZT pairs are indicated by upper and lower case letters for 
pairs of alleles (A-E) and environmental factors to which they are subject (F-J).  
 
et al. 2008, Couzin-Frankel 2010).  Moreover, considering heterogeneity of underlying 
factors is a matter of attention to environmental as well as genetic factors. 
 
4. What is to be done? 
What can researchers do on the basis of knowing that a trait’s heritability or another 
fraction of variance is high when the factors underlying that trait might be 
heterogeneous?  As will become evident, the range of options for human studies 
becomes very limited.  Perspective on this can be gained by examining what is and is 
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not possible in an agricultural trial, in which control over varieties and locations is far 
greater than with human variation.  This example, in turn, provides food for thought if we 
move beyond Davey Smith’s advice that epidemiology is concerned with the mean of 
the group and has to discount random variation around that mean (see section 7). 
Typically, in an agricultural trial there is variety by location interaction (i.e., 
genotype by environment interaction) in the analysis of trait variation, which means that 
for the trait in question the ranking of varieties varies across locations; the best variety 
in one location is not the best in other locations.  The possibility of heterogeneity 
underlying the variation in trait means can, however, be reduced by grouping varieties 
that are similar in responses across locations using techniques of cluster analysis (Byth 
et al. 1976), or in other words, by grouping according to similarity in variety means 
together with variety by location interaction means.  (Similarly, locations can be grouped 
by similarity in responses elicited from varieties grown across those locations.)  
Varieties in any resulting group tend to be above average for a location in the same 
locations and below average in the same location (Figure 4). 
Now, the wider the range of locations in the measurements on which the 
grouping is based, the more likely it is that the ups and downs shared by varieties in a 
group are produced by the same conjunctions of underlying measurable factors.  This 
gives researchers more license to discount the possibility of underlying heterogeneity 
within a group.  They can then hypothesize about the group means—about what factors 
in the locations elicited basically the same response from varieties in a particular variety 
group that distinguishes them from other groups.  Of course, knowledge from sources 
other than the data analysis is always needed to help researchers generate any 
hypotheses about genetic and environmental factors. 
For example, imagine a group of plant varieties that originated from particular 
parental stock more susceptible to plant rusts, a form of parasitic fungi, and that these 
varieties yielded poorly in locations where rainfall occurred in concentrated periods on 
poorly drained soils.  The obvious hypothesis about genetic factors modulated by 
environmental factors is that these varieties share genes from the parental stock that 
are related to rust susceptibility and this susceptibility is evident in the measurements of 





Figure 4.  Yields for 5 groups of wheat varieties grown in 13 groups of locations (from 
Byth et al. 1976; reproduced with permission).  The x-axis is the mean over all varieties 
for that location.  The individual varieties (not shown) were clustered into these 5 groups 
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by similarity of response across locations.  These groups were then clustered into two 
groups as shown in the two plots.  
 
comparing the variety and parental genomes, it may be possible to identify specific sets 
of genes that are shared, to investigate whether and how each one contributes to rust 
susceptibility in certain environmental conditions, and to use that knowledge in 
subsequent research or in planting recommendations (Taylor 2006).  (Of course, plant 
breeders can make informed decisions about what varieties to cross even in the 
absence of knowledge about the specific genetic factors and environmental conditions 
involved.) 
What role does heritability play in research that groups varieties, thus reducing 
underlying heterogeneity and facilitating the generation of hypotheses about underlying 
genetic and environmental factors?  Answer: Very little.  Clustering ensures that the 
variation among the means for groups of varieties is much higher than the average 
variation among variety means within groups.  The low within-group variation allows the 
selective breeder to select from the variety group without being very concerned about 
whether any one variety is the best within that group across all the locations.  In other 
words, heritability within the variety group is not so important.  At the same time, even if 
variation among variety group means is smaller than variation among location means or 
variation among variety by location interaction means (that is, between-group heritability 
is small), researchers can still hypothesize about the group means.  In short, the size of 
the fractions of variance is not key to hypothesizing about the underlying genetic and 
environmental factors. 
 Grouping varieties by similarity of responses across locations becomes more 
difficult when varieties are observed in only a few locations or when the locations are 
not the same from one variety to the next.  This is the case, of course, for variation 
among traits in humans.  It should be noted, however, that reduction of underlying 
heterogeneity, although helpful, is not essential to agricultural and laboratory breeding.  
Breeders know, by the very definition of heritability, that a high value means that 
differences among the mean values for the varieties make up much of the total variation 
for the trait in question.  So the breeders can mate or cross individuals with the desired 
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values for the trait, expecting that this will lead to offspring with similar, desired values, 
and thus to improvement in the overall average compared with the previous generation.  
Now, if there is underlying heterogeneity, the reassortment of genes from parents may 
well lead to some far-from-expectation offspring, even when the offspring are raised in 
the locations of their parents (in the example given in Figure 3, AabbCcDDEe subject to 
the factors FghiJ or FgHiJ).  Yet, such outcomes are not troubling to breeders because 
they can compensate when the results do not meet their expectations.  They discard the 
far-from-expectation offspring and select only those offspring that do have the desired 
values. 
In the study of human traits, selective mating and discarding of defectives is 
obviously not acceptable.  Nor is it possible to replicate human genetic material together 
with the environmental conditions of many defined locations.  It is impossible to have 
the level of control needed to obtain data for grouping varieties that are similar in 
responses across locations.  In short, as noted earlier, human studies involve 
substantially less control over materials and conditions than agricultural and laboratory 
trials.  Researchers should expect, therefore, to gain correspondingly less insight about 
genetic and environmental factors from partitioning of variation for a human trait into the 
various fractions. 
Returning then to the question with which this section began: What then can 
researchers do once they acknowledge that similarity among human twins or a set of 
close relatives may well be associated with similarity of yet-to-be-identified genetic 
factors but the factors may not be the same from one set of relatives to the next, or from 
one location to the next?  Researchers have three options for proceeding on the basis 
of knowing that a trait’s heritability is high when the factors underlying that trait might be 
heterogeneous: 
1. Undertake research to identify the specific, measurable genetic and 
environmental factors without reference to the trait’s heritability or the other fractions of 
the total variance.   (e.g., Moffitt et al. 2005, Davey Smith and Ebrahim 2007, Khoury et 
al. 2007). 
2. Restrict attention to variation within a set of relatives.  For example, even if the 
underlying factors are unknown, high heritability still means that if one twin develops the 
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trait, e.g., type 1 diabetes, the other twin is more likely to as well.  This information might 
stimulate the second twin to take measures to reduce the health impact if and when the 
disease starts to appear.  However, notice that this scenario assumes that the timing of 
getting the condition differs from the first twin to the second.  Researchers might well 
then ask: What factors influence the timing?  How changeable are these?  How much 
reduction in risk comes from changing them?  To address these issues they would have 
to identify the genetic and environmental factors involved in the development of the trait, 
but to do so requires larger sample sizes than any single set of relatives allows.  In any 
case, the question would then arise as to whether the initial results would carry over 
from one set of relatives to others.  Resolving this question is an empirical matter, but it 
is obvious that carry over becomes less likely the more heterogeneity there is in the 
factors underlying the development of the trait.  Researchers have to be prepared, 
therefore, for the possibility that the proportion of fruitful investigations will be low 
compared to those confounded by factors not carrying over well from the initial set of 
relatives. 
3. Use high heritability as an indicator that “the trait [is] a potentially worthwhile 
candidate for molecular research” to identify the specific genetic factors involved 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2002, chap. 11) and hope that for some traits a gradient 
of a measurable genetic factor (or composite of factors) runs through the differences 
among variety means.  Such traits might be worth finding even if, in the course of doing 
so, researchers end up conducting many fruitless investigations of other high-heritability 
traits for which it turns out there is no such gradient.   
Equivalent options apply to proceeding on the basis of knowing another fraction 
of a trait’s variance is high but the factors underlying that trait might be heterogeneous.   
In particular, when a high value for the among-location-means (or “shared 
environmental”) fraction of variance is used to decide when to search for the specific 
environmental factors involved, the hope is that for some traits a gradient of a 
measurable environmental factor (or composite of factors) runs through the differences 
among location means.  Again, this option involves the possibility of fruitless 
investigations of traits for which there is no gradient in underlying factors.  Similarly, if 
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the researcher chooses to look for specific measurable factors underlying high fractions 
of non-shared environmental variance and variety-location interaction variance. 
The possibility of fruitless investigations of traits for which there is no gradient in 
underlying factors is not the only concern researchers should have about being guided 
by high estimates of heritability or other fractions of variance in the traits.  As the next 
section explains, there are more serious problems about estimates and interpretation of 
fractions of variance for human traits.  (Appendix A is provided to counter the response 
that, given decades of debate among methodologically sophisticated scholars, it is 
implausible that some fundamental problems in quantitative genetic estimation could 
have been overlooked [Kendler 2005].  The appendix describes some of the 
background that has allowed the author to see the study of heredity and variation 
differently from most researchers and philosophers of science who have contributed to 
debates about classical quantitative genetics.) 
 
5. Unreliable estimates of fractions of variance for human traits 
The reliability of the established methods of estimation of fractions of variance for 
human traits can be checked by considering a hypothetical agricultural trial where every 
variety is raised in every location and replicated twice and where the replicates for each 
variety-location combination are either monozygotic or dizygotic twins (Taylor 2012).  
The analysis of variance allows one to estimate the trait’s actual heritability in that trial, 
that is, the fraction of the trait’s variance associated with differences among the means 
for the varieties, where these means are taken over all locations and replicates.  
Similarly, the actual fractions can be estimated for the among-location-means variance, 
the among-variety-location-interaction-means fraction, and the residual or “error” 
variance, that is, the average variance within variety-location-combinations.  At the 
same time, given that the replicates are twins, one can also estimate the fractions of 
variance using the standard formulas of human quantitative genetics (Rijsdijk and Sham 
2002).  If the standard formulas do not yield estimates that match the correct values 
from the analysis of variance, something must be wrong with those formulas. 
That the standard formulas of human quantitative genetics do not, indeed, match 
the correct values can be demonstrated theoretically and through analysis of simulated 
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agricultural trials (Taylor 2007, 2012).  To appreciate why the standard formulas, as well 
as their generalization as Structural Equation Models, do not yield reliable values, it is 
helpful to note the following features of those formulas: 
1. The standard formulas and Structural Equation Models do not separate a 
variety-location-interaction variance fraction, but subsume it in the among-variety-
means variance fraction, that is, in the so-called heritability estimate. 
2. Empirical estimation of the variety-location-interaction variance fraction is 
nevertheless possible, but only if the appropriate classes of data are available; that is 
not often the case.  For example, it is not common to have data about monozygotic 
twins raised in separate locations in which there is no correlation from one twin’s 
location to the other. 
3. Partitioning of trait variation into components rests on models of hypothetical, 
idealized genes with simple Mendelian inheritance and direct contributions to the trait.  
Given that the data are about traits, an analysis of trait variation that makes no 
reference to theoretical, idealized genes must also be possible (Taylor 2012).  Such a 
gene-free analysis affirms the distinction made in section 2, that estimation of heritability 
is associated with analysis of variation in traits, not transmission of heritable factors. 
4. The derivation of the standard formulas and models assumes that, all other 
things being equal, similarity in traits for relatives is proportional to the fraction shared 
by the relatives of all the genes that vary in the population.  For example, fraternal or 
dizygotic twins share half of the variable genes that identical or monozygotic twins 
share.  However, plausible models of the contributions of multiple genes to a trait can 
be shown to result in, all other things being equal, ratios of dizygotic similarity to 
monozygotic similarity that are not .5 and that vary considerably around their average 
(Taylor 2007).  This point here does not depend on the validity of any particular 
hypothetical model of multiple genes contributing to the trait.  The assumption is 
unreliable because the relevant correlations need to be based on observed traits and, 
as such, cannot be directly given by the proportion of shared genes involved in the 
development of those traits.  For the same reason, heuristic values of the similarity of 
relatives of other degrees, which are ubiquitous, are also unreliable.  (Identifying the 
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exact fraction of genes shared by relatives [Visscher et al. 2006] does not address the 
problem that similarity in traits for relatives need not be proportional to this fraction.) 
5.  Empirical estimation of a parameter to take degree of relatedness into 
account depends on the appropriate classes of data being available.  Data about 
unrelated individuals raised in the same location are especially valuable. 
6.  The residual variance, or the sub-fraction of that variance not related to 
measurement error, has been interpreted as a “non-shared environmental effect," where 
a large value means that within-family or "non-shared environmental differences" are 
large relative to the effects due to the members of a family growing up in the same 
location or "shared environmental differences" (Plomin 1999; see critical review by 
Turkheimer and Waldron 2000).  The more careful interpretation is that residual 
variance corresponds to the variation of trait differences among replicates within variety-
location combinations that has no systematic relation to variation among variety means, 
among location means, or among variety-location combinations.  Now, to interpret the 
unsystematic variation of a trait in terms of differences in the underlying factors is not 
warranted in the first place (see first paragraph of section 4).  However, if one were to 
go ahead and attempt to do just that, the interaction of genetic as well as environmental 
factors in specific variety-location combinations would need to be included in the 
picture. 
When Davey Smith, the epidemiologist, invokes human behavioral genetics, he 
cites the work of Turkheimer, a researcher on the more critical wing of his field.  
Turkheimer (2004) emphasizes, as this article does, that a heterogeneity of pathways 
can lead to the traits measured.  The implications for human sciences that he and 
Davey Smith attach to heterogeneous pathways are, however, colored by an 
insufficiently critical interpretation of human quantitative genetic estimates.  In particular, 
following point 6 above, those estimates can provide no warrant for the claim they make 
that the non-shared environmental influences overshadow common environmental 
influences.   Moreover, a corollary of the discussion so far is that none of Turkheimer’s 
(2000) three laws of behavioral genetics is reliable; nor is an oft-cited addition (labeled 4 
in Table 1).  
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Table 1.  Laws of behavioral genetics, recast 
Laws of behavioral genetics Revised statement 
1. All human behavioral traits are 
heritable. 
1. All human behavioral traits show heritability, but: 
a. estimation methods are not reliable; and b. 
heritability does not mean that the “genetic” 
(among-variety-means) variance translates into 
differences in genetic factors across the population 
studied. 
2. The effect of being raised in 
the same family is smaller than 
the effect of the genes. 
2. This effect has not been established, because a. 
estimation methods are not reliable; and b. fractions 
of variance do not translate into differences in 
genetic and environmental factors across the 
population studied.  
3. A substantial portion of the 
variation in complex human 
behavioral traits is not accounted 
for by the effects of genes or 
families. 
3. The residual fraction of the variation in complex 
human behavioral traits is often substantial, but the 
interaction of unknown genetic as well as 
environmental factors specific to the particular 
variety-location combinations underlies this 
unsystematic variation. 
4. Heritability tends to increase 
over people's lifetimes, that is, 
genetic differences come to 
eclipse environmental differences 
(Plomin 1999). 
4.  Unless the estimation method separates the 
interaction fraction from heritability and it is shown 
to be negligible, this trend could equally well 
indicate that the interaction component increases 
over time. 
 
The critical account provided above and in previous sections calls into question 
the interpretation from human quantitative genetics that “non-shared environmental” 
influences among siblings overshadow shared environmental influences.  (Appendix B 
can be referred to for responses to the critical account and counter-responses.)  Yet, if 
the analogy that Davey Smith draws to the lack of success in the search for systematic 
aspects of those “non-shared environmental influences” has been undercut, we are still 
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left with the difficulty epidemiology has had in moving from significant population-level 
risk factors to improved prediction of cases at an individual level.  To address that issue, 
the next section extends the possibility of underlying heterogeneity raised in sections 3 
and 4, and reviews several additional forms of heterogeneity.  The final section captures 
in four conceptual themes the potential significance for epidemiology of various forms of 
heterogeneity. 
 
6.  Heterogeneity of heterogeneities 
 
It is quite simple to extend the possibility of underlying heterogeneity to epidemiology: 
when similar responses of different groups of people are observed, it need not be 
assumed that similar conjunctions of risk and protective factors have been involved in 
producing those responses.  One difference, however, is that, whereas in quantitative 
genetics the different varieties or locations are not distinguished by some measurable 
genetic or environmental factors, in epidemiology the different groups of people are 
typically characterized by reference to measurable factors, such as socio-economic 
status, gender, or even genetic factors.  The following example, in which researchers 
detected associations of a trait with a combination of measurable genetic and 
environmental factors, serves to illustrate this distinction and, at the same time, point to 
various other forms of heterogeneity.  (The example is also used to illustrate conceptual 
points in section 7, but no endorsement of the importance or generality of the results 
should be read into this choice; see Wasserman 2004 and Morris et al. 2007 for critical 
commentaries.)   
Figure 5 depicts a reported association of behavior with enzymatic activity related 
to a single-locus genetic variant, MAOA, and with the social or environmental factor, 
childhood maltreatment (Caspi et al. 2002).  The association of MAOA and childhood 
maltreatment with anti-social behavior is an instance of gene-environment interaction, a 
term that refers to the statistical interaction between measured genetic factors and 
measured environmental factors (Moffitt 2005).  In other words, the association of the 
trait with the genetic factor is modified by the value of the environmental factor, and vice 
versa.  (Such interaction, confusingly, has no conceptual or empirical relationship to 
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“genotype-environment interaction” or variety-location interaction, as discussed in 
sections 2-6.)  The example involves a single genetic variant, but Genome-Wide 
Association (GWA) studies are now able to quantify the mean effect of each of a wide 
array of variants across the human genome on a trait, such as mean height differential 




Figure 5. Mean adult composite anti-social behavior score in relation to levels of 
MonoAmineOxidaseA and Level of Childhood Maltreatment for a sample from Dunedin, 
New Zealand (Caspi et al. 2002, 852; reproduced with permission). 
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Epidemiologists should be familiar with heterogeneity of various forms that 
complicate the statistical association of a trait with measurable factors.  Consider the 
MAOA-maltreatment example:  
1. The points plotted in Figure 5 represent a mean value, around which there is 
variation (which is the simplest form of heterogeneity) in the measure of antisocial 
behavior.   
2. The binary of high-versus-low MAOA activity is a simplification of the many 
variants in the MAOA gene and related regulatory regions (Di Giovanni et al. 2008, 
84ff).   
3. Similarly, childhood maltreatment varies in nature, degree, and timing, as well 
as in its meaning to the child.   
4. The trait in question, anti-social behavior, can be assessed in different ways 
(indeed, Figure 3 plots a composite index derived from various assessments).   
5. Even for any one assessment of anti-social behavior, different individuals may 
have arrived at similar values through different pathways of development (in the same 
way that is clearly the case for development of human height). 
Equivalent considerations pertain to the effects associated with multiple genetic variants 
exposed through GWA studies (although the number of GWA studies of interactions 
between genetic and environmental factors is still small).  In short, there is a 
heterogeneity of heterogeneities. 
 
7. What is to be done?—Part II 
Should epidemiologists follow Davey Smith’s advice to accept considerable 
randomness at the individual level and keep their focus on modifiable causes of disease 
at the population level?  Or are there other courses of action?  In particular, when 
researchers find a statistical association of a trait with measurable risk or protective 
factors, what can they do given the potential for various forms of heterogeneity to 
complicate the association?  These questions are viewed in relation to four conceptual 
themes in the sub-sections to follow.  The cases used are presented with a view to 
motivating the conceptual themes, not to surveying the literature on any of the cases. 
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7.1 The push for individualized or personalized medicine can lead to more population-
level treatment or treatment according to the mean of one’s group.  
Consider population-level approaches in the MAOA-maltreatment case.  As the 
authors conclude, their results "could inform the development of future pharmacological 
treatments" (Caspi et al. 2002, 853).   By implication, if low-MAOA children could be 
identified, prophylatic drug treatment could reduce their propensity to anti-social 
behavior as adults, or, more strictly, their vulnerability to childhood maltreatment insofar 
as that increases their propensity to anti-social behavior as adults.  Reciprocally, if 
severe childhood maltreatment could be identified and reduced or stopped early, this 
action could nullify the influence of a child’s MAOA level on undesired adult outcomes.  
The risk reduction for anti-social behavior produced by each population-level approach 
would depend on whether the threshold for unacceptable anti-social behavior is set high 
or low.  
Of course, with only 3% of the population in the low-MAOA plus severe-
maltreatment category, epidemiologists might not recommend any population-level 
action based on the reported association.  Moreover, they may wait to see if the results 
in this case apply to populations other than that of the original study (Wasserman 2004, 
Morris et al. 2007).  Indeed, some meta-analyses have cast doubt on the generality of a 
similar study by Caspi, Moffitt and collaborators (Risch et al. 2009).   Suppose, 
however, for discussion purposes, that something analogous to the MAOA-
maltreatment result is replicated and the proportion in the high-risk category is sufficient 
to stimulate action.  The population-level approaches could still run into troubles, in the 
following manner. 
Notice that Figure 3 presents the means; around any mean there will be 
variation. From other figures in the study (Caspi et al. 2002) it can be seen that some of 
the high-MAOA individuals end up with higher anti-social behavior scores than some of 
the low-MAOA individuals.  Moreover, depending on the threshold, a substantial fraction 
of the low-MAOA plus severe-maltreatment category does not end up as anti-social 
adults.  Yet, in practice, once the resources were invested to screen children for MAOA 
levels, the attention of parents, teachers, social workers, and so on would be focused 
on all low-MAOA children.  Indeed, how could treatment on the basis of group 
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membership be avoided if such adults do not know from a childhood MAOA assessment 
whether any particular individual is one who would go on, after childhood maltreatment, 
to become an antisocial adult?  (Of course, adults would take other traits into account in 
how they treated any child, but what is relevant here is how information about MAOA 
status influences treatment.) 
Now, some of the parents of low-MAOA children might resist their children being 
treated according to the mean of the MAOA group.  They might also balk at years of 
prophylatic drug treatment or of maltreatment monitoring by social workers.  These 
parents—together with others concerned about the same issues—could push for 
additional research to identify other characteristics that differentiate among the low-
MAOA children (and perhaps also help predict who among the high-MAOA children are 
vulnerable).  It may be that no systematic characteristics would be found; variation 
within the low- and high-MAOA subpopulations would then fit Davey Smith’s view of 
unavoidable randomness.  Nevertheless, it would have been understandable that 
researchers had sought a more refined account of risk factors than given by the 
population-level approaches. 
To understand the need for more refined risk accounts is not, however, to 
endorse the pursuit of personalized medicine customized to the individual.  Indeed, the 
scenario played out above points to a serious shortcoming of that very endeavor.  In its 
simplest form, personalized medicine involves the use of genetic information to predict 
which patients with a given condition (e.g., heart aryhthmia) will benefit from a particular 
drug treatment (e.g., beta blockers).  More ambitiously, personalized medicine promises 
to inform people of their heightened vulnerability or resistance to specific environmental, 
dietary, therapeutic, and other factors early enough so they can adjust their exposure 
and risky behaviors accordingly. 
If the MAOA analogy holds, the path to personalized medicine would often 
involve a phase in which large numbers of people are treated according to their group 
membership.  Consider, however, which kinds of medical conditions would receive the 
necessary investment in pharmaceutical and sociological research, screening, and 
preventative treatment or monitoring to address the conjunction of genetic and 
environmental factors involved.  Some well-organized parental advocacy groups may 
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secure funding to address the prenatal or neonatal diagnosis and post-natal treatment 
of rare debilitating genetic disorders (Panofsky 2011, Terry et al. 2007), as happens 
with phenylketonuria.  However, public and corporate policy would more likely focus on 
conditions with a large value for the average benefit of ameliorating the effect of the 
genetic difference multiplied by number of people considered vulnerable. 
For high-average-benefit conditions, taking the MAOA case as a guide, if the 
effect of the genetic difference depends on identified social or environmental factors, 
and if variability within the groups that have on-average high and low vulnerability 
produces a problem of misclassification, then pressure would arise for researchers to 
differentiate among individuals within the groups.  However, until distinguishing 
characteristics were found, parents, teachers, doctors, social workers, insurance 
companies, policy makers, friends, and the individuals themselves could make no better 
use of the genetic information than to treat individuals according to which genetic group 
they belonged to.  (Again, some people listed in the previous sentence would take other 
traits into account in how they treated any individual, but what is relevant here is how 
the genetic information influences that treatment.)  Moreover, if the additional research 
were not conducted or were not successful, or if the cost of differentiating among 
individuals were too high, we might never get beyond treating individuals according to 
their genetic-group membership.  In short, an under-acknowledged danger in the pursuit 
of personalized medicine lies, ironically, in genetic information being used to treat 
people according to the mean of their genetic group—a population-level approach—
leaving variation around that mean accepted as unavoidable noise. 
 
7.2  It can be quite reasonable to try to differentiate among individuals so as to improve 
risk prediction, even though finding ways to do so may not be straightforward. 
Consider the modifiability in practice of any given population-level risk factor and 
take the MAOA-maltreatment scenario as a thought experiment.  Population-level 
measures would require more than finding a safe and effective prophylatic drug 
treatment.  MAOA screening would need to become routine, compliance with the 
treatment achieved, and so-called side-effects addressed—including the effects of 
considering all low-MAOA children as incipiently anti-social.  On the maltreatment side, 
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the detection and prevention of childhood maltreatment might entail intrusions into many 
households, surveillance or mandatory reporting, monitoring and intervention by state 
agencies, diversion of government budgets from other needs, and so on.  In short, even 
if reduced childhood maltreatment were seen as a positive outcome, the means might 
not be unconditionally positive to all (Wasserman 2004). 
What the example illustrates is that, for the population-level approach to make 
sense, the population-level risk factor has to be modifiable in practice.  This depends on 
the political, economic, and cultural circumstances around public health measures, as is 
well illustrated by the uneven implementation of laws in the United States requiring seat 
belt use in cars (Wikipedia 2011).  Moreover, the effects of shifting the distribution of 
that factor should not disadvantageous to individuals who are not high risk.  Unless both 
of these conditions hold, it makes sense to search for risk factors that differentiate 
individuals within a population.  For some traits such a search might reveal no 
systematic characteristics; variation within the populations would then fit Davey Smith’s 
view of unavoidable randomness.   However, for other traits the within-population risk 
factors might be identifiable; some of these factors might be easier to modify than the 
population-level factors. 
The population-level approach, advocated most famously by Rose (1985), is well 
illustrated by the case of smoking and lung cancer.  The relative and absolute risks of 
smoking are high; there is a dose-response curve (Bjartveit and Tverdal 2005); and the 
historical trends after allowing for latency match smoking rates.  Moreover, population-
level policies, such as cigarette taxes and indoor smoking bans, are not 
disadvantageous for the health of those smokers who turn out to be less susceptible to 
lung cancer.  Nor are the policies disadvantageous to others outside the population in 
question, i.e., non-smokers.  In short, there seems to be little incentive now that 
smoking-reduction policies are gained traction, to find ways to screen for high-risk 
individuals and focus resources on treating them. 
 Most cases are, however, not like smoking and lung cancer; the justification for 
de-emphasizing within-population risk factors is usually far less clear.  Consider 
cardiovascular disease.  Lynch and colleagues reported that for a population of Finnish 
men, “94.6% of [coronary heart disease] events occurred among men exposed to at 
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least one conventional risk factor” (smoking, hypertension, dyslipidaemia, and 
diabetes).  They concluded that the focus of efforts to reduce coronary heart disease 
should be on reducing these factors, not on further refinement of psychosocial or other 
risk factors (Lynch et al. 2006).  Yet, focusing on the conventional risk factors could 
translate variously to population-level efforts for smoking reduction, to screening for and 
treatment of individuals at high risk for hypertension, dyslipidaemia, and diabetes, or to 
some hybrid effort in which anti-smoking efforts highlighted the special risk, say, to 
people with high blood pressure.  In short, it would be very reasonable for anyone 
promoting or subject to the screening and treatment approach to be interested in 
improved prediction of who is at high risk. 
In this vein, Ridker et al. (2007) noted that the conventional risk factors for heart 
disease in women (as combined in the Framingham score) misclassify many women as 
of intermediate risk who were actually higher or lower risk.  Ridker et al’s refined 
Reynolds Risk Score performs better primarily, it seems, by including the risk marker 
cReactive Protein (CRP).  Health policymakers might examine the ratio of benefits from 
improved risk determination to the increased cost from measuring CRP levels.  
Biomedical researchers might see inclusion of CRP in the Reynolds Risk Score as 
grounds for examining mechanisms around a rise in CRP levels for an individual.  They 
might hope for eventual improvement in therapy and prevention—perhaps targeted at 
high-risk individuals, but perhaps also yielding population-level interventions. 
It turns out that CRP is almost surely a marker, not a direct cause or valid 
candidate for therapeutic reduction (C Reactive Protein Coronary Heart Disease 
Genetics Collaboration 2011).  Yet the point remains:  Focusing on modifiable causes of 
disease at the population level is a choice for epidemiologists that is not dictated solely 
or primarily by considerable randomness at the individual level.  There are situations in 
which it is quite reasonable to be interested in improved prediction of cases at an 
individual level.  The value of any such improvements, however, depends on the 
economics of health policy as well as on whether a richer picture of risk factors 
translates through biomedical research into improvements in therapy and possibly 
prevention. 
Suppose researchers decide neither to discount nor to give blanket acceptance 
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to randomness at the individual level.  What they then face is not unbridled exploration 
of risk factors that might differentiate individuals or sub-groups within the population.  
Rather, it is the challenge of exposing possible risk factors and assessing which ones 
are worth considering for insertion into refined risk equations for screening and 
treatment.  And for this challenge there are no off-the-shelf guidelines.  Consider the 
following contrasting cases.  The pathway seems straightforward in the “changing view 
of pathophysiology” underlying atherothrombosis, which led Ridker et al. (2007) to 
assay a large number of biomarkers then compare a range of new risk prediction 
equations that included CRP and other markers.  The role of refined within-population 
distinctions has, however, been more subtle in the research and discussions of Lustig 
and his colleagues around the association of sugar (i.e., fructose-glucose) with 
metabolic syndrome of diabetes, hypertension, lipid problems, and cardiovascular 
disease (Lustig et al. 2012).  They end up advocating a population-level policy of 
reducing availability of sugar, but the path to that position is more complex.  Arguments 
over epidemiological associations—after all, countries with high sugar consumption also 
have high fat consumption—are combined with physiological research to unravel 
mechanisms of metabolism under various conditions.  The latter research takes note, 
among other things, that “20% of obese people have normal metabolism and… up to 
40% of normal-weight people develop the diseases that constitute the metabolic 
syndrome” (Lustig et al. 2012).  This observation led to epidemiological comparisons 
among countries that controlled for physical activity and being overweight or obese, 
which have shown that “[d]ifferences in sugar availability statistically explain variations 
in diabetes prevalence rates at a population level” (Basu et al. 2013). 
Now, even if it turned out that approaches other than limiting sugar consumption 
for the population were more feasible or effective in reducing coronary heart disease, 
juxtaposing the Ridker and Lustig examples suffices to make the point that no simple 
guidelines can be expected for research and policy for risk factors that differentiate 
among individuals.  That, however, is no argument against trying to differentiate among 
individuals so as to improve risk prediction.   
 29 
7.3  When researchers think about the causal dynamics underlying patterns in data, 
such as associations with risk factors, it may be helpful not to see deviations from 
patterns as noise and to pay attention to heterogeneity in forms such as there being 
multiple paths to the “same” trait.   
The observation that CRP improves risk prediction even though it is not a causal 
factor points to a further challenge.  The conventional way to think about risk factors is 
to distinguish the modifiable (e.g., blood pressure) from the non-modifiable  (e.g., 
gender).  We envisage modifying the former so as to change the risk; for the latter 
clinicians screen more vigilantly or researchers investigate further with a view to 
exposing what modifiable risk factors underlie them.  There is, however, an alternative 
way of thinking about both kinds of risk factors, namely to see them as patterns 
detected in data generated by some unknown causal dynamics.  Then, when 
researchers envisage modifying a risk factor, they are hoping that the causal dynamics 
generating past data persist into the current situation and that modification of a factor 
does not restructure those dynamics—or, at least, not very much.   
To modify factors without restructuring dynamics would mean, for example, that, 
if low income is a risk factor for a condition (e.g., stress as measured by some 
biomarker), an experiment in which some families get a lump sum increase in income 
would be expected to lead to a lower rate of that condition.  If this expectation seems 
crude, it is because we are not surprised by results that indicate greater complexity in 
the causal dynamics that generated the patterns as well as in the modified dynamics 
emerging under the experiment.  Ludwig et al. (2012), for example, showed that for 
families joining an experiment in which some were randomly chosen to move “from a 
high-poverty to lower-poverty neighborhood,” moving “leads to long-term (10- to 15-
year) improvements in adult physical and mental health and subjective well-being, 
despite not affecting economic self-sufficiency.”  The challenge that such examples 
pose for epidemiologists is to expose the causal dynamics generating patterns in data, 
moreover to do so in ways that provide expectations for how the dynamics might be 
modified by interventions.  Such interventions might be at a population level or they 
might be only among high-risk individuals. 
Exposing underlying causal dynamics may strike data analysts as an elusive 
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goal, but it is instructive to at least entertain the quest.  First, to avoid setting off in the 
wrong direction, researchers might find avoid using the term “risk factor” because its 
causal connotations invite confusion—perhaps “risk-associated variable” instead?  They 
should also put aside the contrast between modifiable causes of conditions at the 
population level and randomness at the individual level.  That framing leads us to see 
deviation from a risk equation as noise whereas it could indicate the gap between the 
fitted equation and the causal dynamics generating the data.  Then researchers might 
pick up the possibility of heterogeneity in genetic and environmental factors underlying 
heritability and other fractions of the variation for a trait.  Attention to this possibility can 
be readily extended so that, when similar responses of different individual types are 
observed, researchers do not assume that similar conjunctions of risk or protective 
factors have been involved in producing those responses.  There may be multiple 
pathways to the same trait value.  In this vein, the data analyses of Kendler et al. (2002) 
and Ou (2005) in psychology and education are notable for exposing alternative 
pathways—as well as admirable for their reserve about how to interpret their fitted 
models causally.  
Attention to heterogeneity may lead us to reconceive the trait being analyzed as 
a heterogeneous mix of traits.  Tilley (2000) provides a striking exemplar of this in his 
discussion of evaluations of the effect of Closed Circuit television (CCTV) on crime in 
parking lots.  Such evaluations could mix together studies of situations in which different 
mechanisms (or a mix of mechanisms) and different contexts apply.  The different 
CCTV-crime studies might be subject to a meta-analysis, but no meaningful 
recommendation would be likely, even if all results were in the same direction (see also 
Cartwright and Hardie 2012).  Even though not all phenomena are like CCTV and crime, 
key variables in epidemiology, such as socioeconomic status, admit to substantial 
heterogeneity.  As Davey-Smith et al. (2000) note: “socioeconomic categories—whether 
based on education, employment, occupational social class or housing tenure—may 
have neither the same nor consistent meanings in different ethnic groups.”  Moreover, 
especially in relation to implications for action, different kinds of heterogeneity can be 
distinguished, ranging from a "cabinet of curiosities" to “participatory restructuring 
through multiple points of engagement” (Taylor 2011).  Discussion of different senses of 
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heterogeneity would require a separate article, but the issue of meaning is picked up in 
the final angle to follow, which brings this article to a close on a speculative note. 
 
7.4  Attention to the meaning of life events and other factors can allow for 
heterogeneous events to be subsumed under single factors.  However, given the labor-
intensive nature of research into meaning, epidemiologists may need the subjects to 
show how they connect knowledge with action to change their lives and communities in 
response to ongoing social changes in specific situations.   
A line of research initiated by the sociologists Brown and Harris in the late 1960s 
has investigated how severe events and difficulties during people's life course influence 
the onset of mental and physical illnesses Harris (2000).  Brown and Harris use wide-
ranging interviews, ratings of transcripts for the significance of past events in their 
context (with the rating done blind, that is, without knowledge of whether the person 
became ill), and statistical analyses.  Because what might be recorded as the same 
event, e.g., death of a spouse, might have very different meanings and significance for 
different subjects according to the context, Brown and Harris’s methods accommodate 
events with diverse meanings.  At the same time, apparently heterogeneous events can 
be subsumed under one factor, such as, in explanation of depression, a severe, 
adverse event in the year prior to onset.  In sum, their Life Events and Difficulties 
methodology integrates “the quantitative analyses of epidemiology and the [in] depth 
understanding of the case history approach” (Brown and Harris 1989, x). 
 The methodology of Brown and Harris is labor intensive; many who have been 
trained in it have tried to streamline the case-history component and eventually shifted 
to different lines of research.  Suppose, however, that researchers took as starting 
points the labor intensity of methodology that exposes diversity of meanings and the 
possibility of underlying heterogeneity.  One way forward might be to allow the subjects 
in specific situations that continue to change to show how they connect knowledge with 
action.  That is, researchers could depart from the traditional emphasis on exposures 
impinging on subjects and, instead, observe communities where people are resilient 
and reorganize their health, lives and communities in response to social changes 
(Sampson et al. 1997).  Although the patterns and variation among people exposed by 
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those studies might not extrapolate readily over time, place, and scale, they could 
provide a point of departure for research and policy engagements in subsequent 
situations the researchers study. 
Such agent-oriented epidemiologists would need to be conversant with studies of 
resilience and reorganization in communities.  They would need to train in participant 
observation and qualitative methods for research on population health changes that 
arise through grassroots and professional initiatives and then grow into loosely knit 
social movements, e.g., around innovations in short-term therapy for depression (e.g., 
Griffin and Tyrrell 2007, White 2007).  In return, they—or anyone following the other 
three conceptual themes in this section—need not accept Davey Smith’s conclusion 
that considerable randomness at the individual level requires epidemiologists to focus 
on modifiable causes of disease at the population level.  There are pathways to explore 
that take us beyond the gloomy prospect of epidemiology limited in its power to 
generate reliable and useful associations of multiple factors with a disease.  
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Getting beyond the implausibility response 
This article’s primary goal is to promote wider discussion of heterogeneity, in 
various forms, among genetic and epidemiological researchers and philosophers of 
science.  Yet, to undercut the analogy invoked by Davey Smith I take a radical path, 
explaining how the estimates made in human quantitative genetics are unreliable and 
typical interpretations, including interpretation of non-shared environmental influences, 
are unjustified.  Some readers may deem it implausible, given decades of debate 
among methodologically sophisticated scholars, that some fundamental problems in 
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quantitative genetic estimation have been overlooked (Kendler 2005).  With a view to 
moving readers beyond the implausibility response, let me describe some of the 
background that has allowed me to see the study of heredity and variation differently 
from most researchers and philosophers of science who have addressed quantitative 
genetics. 
My initial research work in the mid-1970s involved the statistical analysis of large 
plant breeding trials, in which many cultivated varieties would be tested in each of many 
locations around the world.  A first step in the analysis was to partition the variation in a 
given trait, say, yield of wheat plants, into components related to the averages or means 
of the varieties (across all locations), the means of the locations (across all varieties), 
and so on (see Figure 1).  (Indeed, agricultural breeding was where partitioning of 
variation and measuring heritability originated.)  The challenge for the plant breeders 
with whom I worked was to go beyond the partitioning and hypothesize what it was 
about any variety that led to its pattern of response across locations and what it was 
about any location that led to the varieties’ responses in that location compared to 
others.  Knowing what aspects of, say, the pedigree of the variety or of the environment 
conditions in the location could inform subsequent breeding or cultivation decisions.  
Yet, hypothesis generation was not easy even though we had large and complete data 
sets to work from.  A lesson I took from that research was that the limits to 
hypothesizing about genetic and environmental factors must be even greater when 
researchers partition variation for human traits.  In human studies any genetically-
defined type is, at best, replicated twice—as identical twins—and different genetic types 
cannot be systematically raised across the same range of “locations”—families, socio-
economic conditions, and so on. 
Fast forward to a decade ago: I was learning about three disparate areas of 
quantitative research that attempt to make sense of the complexity of biological and 
social factors that build on each other in the development of the given trait over the life 
course (Taylor 2004).  I was impressed by what had been accomplished, but had some 
reservations about the models used in one of the areas, namely, Dickens and Flynn’s 
(2001) attempt to resolve the IQ paradox, in which researchers find large generation-to-
generation advances in IQ test scores even though the trait is held to have high 
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heritability.  I explained my reservations to Dickens, digested his responses, and 
explained my reservations about his subsequent responses.  In the course of this I 
found myself digger deeper into the conceptual foundations of heritability estimation and 
partitioning of variation.  In order to present a picture that differed from what Dickens, 
Flynn, and others accepted without second thought, I was explicating first principles, not 
disputing specialized models or mathematics or pointing to new data. Making extensive 
use of perspectives and examples from the earlier plant breeding research, my 
exposition took a pedagogical, build-from-the-foundations style (Taylor 2006, 2007, 
2010). 
Meanwhile, my investigation continued of the other two areas—life events and 
difficulties research (Brown and Harris 1989) and developmental origins of chronic 
diseases (Barker 1998).  Barker’s work led me to life-course epidemiology (Kuh and 
Ben-Shlomo 2004), so I spent time with Ben-Shlomo and the active social epidemiology 
research group at Bristol University.  Davey Smith is a leading figure in that group and 
co-edits the International Journal of Epidemiology based at Bristol.  While visiting in 
2007 I gave a talk on “new and old debates about genes and environment,” which 
touched on some of the questions about heterogeneity raised in this article.  Davey 
Smith’s spoken response was along the lines of his subsequent “gloomy prospect” 
article: epidemiologists have to accept considerable randomness at the individual level 
and keep the focus on modifiable causes of disease at the population level.  In his 
ensuing article, Davey Smith links this perspective to claims from quantitative genetics, 
thus providing me an opportunity to address social epidemiologists and human 
quantitative geneticists at the same time as I responded to his account.  In bringing my 
interest in heterogeneity to the attention of those audiences, this article extends the first-
principles emphasis of the other recent work and thereby speaks to philosophers of 
science.  My contribution to philosophy takes the form, however, of articulating 
conceptual themes, not dissecting specific cases on empirical, analytical, bioethical or 
policy grounds.  The expository approach reflects the background, with its roots in plant 
breeding trials, that I have sketched in this Appendix, as well as the idea that 
contributing to the conceptual toolbox of readers will prepare them to make their own 
contributions to wider discussion of heredity, variation, and heterogeneity. 
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Appendix B 
Table of objections to critiques of heritability studies and counter-responses 
Response Counter-Response 
There are many definitions or formulas for 
heritability other than the ratio of the 
variance among variety means (genotypic 
values) to the variance of the trait across 
the whole data set. 
The justification for calling the other 
definitions heritability is that they 
approximate the original definition or the 
predictions it provides of advance under 
selection. 
In particular, narrow-sense heritability is 
favored over the broad-sense heritability 
above. 
Narrow-sense heritability can only be 
defined when quantitative genetics employs 
models of hypothetical, idealized genes 
with simple Mendelian inheritance and 
direct contributions to the trait.  However, a 
gene-free analysis of trait variation must 
also be possible (Taylor 2012).   
Genotype-environment interaction 
variance (here: variety-location interaction 
variance) has been shown to be 
negligible for humans. 
From Taylor (2012): “Often cited in this 
vein, Plomin et al. (1977) consider a proxy 
for variety-location interaction, namely, the 
interaction of some variable, e.g., average 
educational attainment, averaged for 
biological parents and for adoptive parents.  
How well such proxy results reflect actual 
variety-location interaction and the 
generality of the low values found by 
Plomin et al.”  has not been established.  
Gene-environment interaction is not 
assumed to be negligible—Indeed, there 
is an institutionalized field of research on 
the topic. 
This use of the term interaction in this 
response refers to the statistical interaction 
between measured genetic factors and 
measured environmental factors.  This is 
conceptually and empirically distinct from 
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variety-location (genotype-environment) 
interaction that means that for the trait in 
question the ranking of varieties varies 
across locations. 
The intraclass correlation formulas in 
heritability studies have been superceded 
by calculations that use Structural 
Equation Models.  
Structural Equation Modeling shares the 
features that render unreliable estimates 
made using the formulas  (see points #1-6 
under Unreliable estimates in section 6). 
"Research into the genetics of complex 
traits has moved from the estimation of 
genetic variance in populations to the 
detection and identification of variants 
that are associated with or directly cause 
variation” (Visscher, et al. 2007) 
Classical quantitative genetics… remains 
relevant in several ways, such as indicating 
that “the trait [is] a potentially worthwhile 
candidate for molecular research” to 
identify the specific genetic factors involved 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2002, chap. 
11) and, in turn, the difficulty of identifying 
such genetic factors has led to concerns 
about “missing heritability” (e.g., Manolio et 
al. 2009). [Text adapted from Taylor (2012)] 
It is past time to move beyond debates on 
the existence of genetic influences. 
The problems summarized in this account 
are worth recognizing: they call most 
estimates and interpretations from human 
quantitative genetics into question; and the 
possibility of underlying heterogeneity that 
arises from the more critical account helps 
in clarifying the challenging paths ahead.   
“It is one thing to criticize the 
methodology of specific studies. It is quite 
another to suggest… that we reject the 
results of an entire field of scientific 
inquiry… It is highly unlikely that modern 
psychiatric genetics will be judged by 
“Human quantitative genetics could be 
viewed, contra Kendler, as akin to 
alchemy… a field of inquiry that provided 
observations, questions, tools, debates, 
careers, and institutions which modern 
chemistry built on, but ultimately had to 
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future historians of science to be in such 
company [as astrology and alchemy].” 
(Kendler 2005, 10) 
break away from to make further progress” 
(Taylor 2010). 
Some assumption has to be made that 
connects similarity in traits for relatives to 
the fraction shared by the relatives of all 
the genes that vary in the population; 
Direct proportionality is as good as any 
other assumption. 
No assumption has to be made because, in 
a gene-free analysis of trait variation, 
empirical estimation of a parameter to take 
degree of relatedness into account is 
possible (Taylor 2012).  In any case, 
estimates should indicate the sensitivity to 
any such assumption. 
It is well known that high heritability does 
not show where to look for the variants. 
It is not widely acknowledged that high 
heritability is not a good indicator of which 
traits are worthwhile candidates for 
molecular research. 
Human quantitative genetics is subject to 
various well-recognized, albeit contested 
objections, for example, has zygosity of 
twins been correctly ascertained and 
representatively sampled?; is the 
treatment or experience of the twins or 
unrelated individuals within a location 
unaffected by whether they are 
monzygotic twins, dizygotic twins, or 
unrelated? (Taylor 2012). 
A focus on these technical issues runs the 
risk of missing or even reinforcing the more 
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